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 
Abstract— The objective of this study is to explore the 
Linkage between Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance in an Emerging Economy in the banking sector of 
Bangladesh. The data have been taken from primary sources. 
Data were collected from 22 listed banks on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE). This data were analyzed by using different 
statistical tools like structural equation model (SEM) with the 
help of SmartPLS-3 software. It is found that some important 
factors like enablers that improve corporate governance, 
obstacles that affect corporate governance; those are the 
influential factors to build performance of selected bank. This 
study further supports the argument that when bank implement 
good corporate governance principles, it experiences improved 
financial performance. This study, with its emphasis on 
developing a corporate governance model, makes a significant 
contribution to the body of knowledge on corporate governance 
in emerging economies like Bangladesh. 
 
Index Terms— Corporate Governance, Financial 
Performance, Discloser & Transparency, Good corporate 
Governance, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Meaning of Corporate Governance is different things to 
different people. Bangladesh achieved a notable economic 
growth during the past few years where the GDP growth rate 
is approximately 6% and above, balance of payments is 
decreased, foreign exchange reserve is in an increasing trend 
and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is increased 142% in the 
last four years which indicates the success of Bangladesh 
economy. The long-term sustainability of the Bangladesh 
“success” story depends critically on the state of corporate 
governance in the country. Many empirical studies have been 
conducted over the last two decades to investigate a 
relationship between corporate governance and a firm’s 
performance in the world. However, similar studies in the 
context of Bangladesh are very rare. Corporate governance 
has become a concern in developing economies since the 
financial scandals in the past, which have resulted in demands 
for improved corporate governance practices (Baydoun et al., 
2012). Following the work of Al-Faki (2006), the 
performance of the banking sector depends on the behavior 
and patronage of the people towards its services. Magdi and 
Nadereh, (2002) have said that the process of ensuring that 
business performs smoothly and investors receive a fair profit  
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is described as corporate governance. Metrick and Ishii (2002) 
see corporate governance as a commitment to pay a fair return  
on the capital invested and the willingness to operate a firm 
efficiently given investments. 
This complements the position of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) that shareholders and creditors confer on managers the 
responsibility to invest in projects with positive net present 
values. 
Corporate governance in both developed and developing 
countries has attracted considerable attention in academic 
research (Mallin, 2004; Reed, 2002; Clark, 2004; Solomon & 
Solomon, 2004; Sternberg, 2004; Weir & Laing, 2001). CG 
contributes to growth and financial stability by reinforcing 
market confidence, financial market integrity and economic 
efficiency (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2004). Good corporate governance is 
an effective tool for helping a firm to attain better 
performance (Ghabayen, 2012). The corporate governance 
code in Bangladesh is based on the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (2004).  Many studies have 
investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1993; Adams & Mehran, 2008; Haniffa & Hudib, 2006; 
Bhagat & Black, 2001; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; 
Klapper & Love, 2004; Ramdani & Van Witteloosuijn, 2009; 
Trabelsi, 2010; Griffin et al., 2014). Onakoya, Adegbemi 
Babatunde O, Fasanya, Ismail O, Ofoegbu and Donald Ikenna 
(2014) conducted a study to explore the effect of corporate 
governance characteristics on bank performance in Nigeria. 
The general area of research is governance, and the specific 
focus is corporate governance principles, practice and its 
effect on financial performance in a developing country, like 
Bangladesh. The aim of the research is to improve governance 
in Bangladesh mainly commercial bank. Our findings are 
important to regulators, investors, academics, and others who 
contend that good corporate governance. 
 
II.  OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY  
 
      The problem in this study was to determine the opinion 
of the selected employees who are engaged in management 
level in private commercial banks in Bangladesh regarding 
their financial performance.   
 To determine the corporate governance factors those 
influence on the bank financial performance of private 
commercial banks in Bangladesh. 
 To give some suggestions for the improvement of overall 
bank performance by using corporate governance concept of 
private commercial banks in Bangladesh. 
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III.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Due to past financial scandals corporate governance has 
become an emerging issue in developing economies which 
demands a better corporate governance practices (Baydoun et 
al., 2012). In the ground of academic research corporate 
governance is an important issue in both developed and 
developing countries (Mallin, 2004; Reed, 2002; Clark, 2004; 
Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Sternberg, 2004; Weir & Laing, 
2001). To attain improved performance, good corporate 
governance performs as a successful tool (Ghabayen, 2012). 
According to principles of Corporate Governance of OECD 
the code of corporate governance of Bangladesh is formulated 
(2004). In Nigeria a research study is performed to see the 
consequence of corporate governance attributes on bank 
performance. Onakoya, Adegbemi Babatunde O, Fasanya, 
Ismail O, Ofoegbu and Donald Ikenna (2014). (Rezaee 2009) 
concludes that no generally accepted set of principles can be 
applied to board structures. By raising the framework of 
stakeholder engagement it is possible to enhance the 
stakeholder engagement associated with the financial 
performance (Sinclair, 2011). Balic and Bwakira (2002) 
report that information gap between stakeholders and 
management can be reduced by confirming higher 
transparency and improved disclosure. They proved that the 
companies which are less transparent and having a lack of 
disclosure are less valued than those companies which are 
higher transparent and having appropriate disclosure. In the 
area of corporate governance framework the board has an 
important role. For monitoring management performance and 
achieving an adequate return for investors the board is 
essential (Ongore & K’Obonyo, 2011). Huq and Bhuiyan 
(March -2012) reports the barriers that affect corporate 
governance practice in Bangladesh. The obstacles are 
accounting standards and disclosure, Bangladesh Accounting 
Standard and Security Exchange Commission requirements, 
inconsistency between Companies act of Bangladesh, 
inefficient regulatory system; domination  of corporate 
ownership structures by family members, inappropriate audit 
report, weak capital market position, no market for corporate 
control, lack of shareholder’s activism, etc. Again in both 
developed and developing countries efficient corporate 
governance acts as a complementary role in terms of 
accelerating the firms’ performance. Several studies proved 
that corporate governance and performance of firm is 
interrelated (e.g., Ehikioya, 2009; Bauer et al., 2008; Gurbuz, 
Aybars & Kutlu, 2010). (Calabrese, Costa, Menichini, Rosati, 
& Sanfelice, 2013) point out that the basic objective of 
corporate governance is to ensure the wealth maximization of 
shareholders and to safeguard the interest of stakeholders. 
They state that currently researchers tried to find out the effect 
of corporate governance on firms performance. A challenge 
was found out that there is no generally accepted ideal 
measure of corporate governance. Ramano et al. (2012), point 
out that good corporate governance should use any variable, 
which has a direct effect on financial performance. (Fernando, 
2009) analyzed that concept of corporate governance has 
gone further as a subject of issue, an objective, or a system 
applied for the interest of shareholders, customers, 
employees, bankers and in fact for the reputation and 
accelerating the nation economy. However, (Chiorazzo et al., 
2008) has suggested corporate ownership and control as the 
measure of corporate governance for large and non-financial 
organizations. Boone, Casares Field Karpoffa and Raheja 
(2007) point out that bank performance is boost up due to 
effective corporate governance practices because it affects the 
bank reputation in overall market. (Abdullah 2004) point out 
that maximization of firm value and shareholder wealth 
maximization depends upon the board’s success. Gillan 
(2006) highlights that board of directors hold the control of 
internal governance system and they are responsible for 
management compensation and monitor the duties of 
management. Epps & Cereola 2008 reports that due to the 
separation of ownership from the company the corporate 
governance arises as the control is handed over management. 
Macus et al. (2008) argues that it is important to keep the 
management in right path, so that they perform for 
shareholder interest in perspective of agency problem. Here 
demand from shareholders is management should avoid 
opportunistic behavior. (Zubaidah 2009) argues that as 
shareholders hire management to utilize their fund so there is 
a competitive advantage of information in favor of 
management. As a result there is an opportunity to utilize the 
fund in their interest. Comparing to emerging economies 
corporate governance has a strong effect on developed 
countries. Kolk and Pinkse (2010) reported that good 
corporate governance is essential for a company and which 
has several benefits. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) 
reported that good corporate governance reduce the risk of 
financial collapse which has overwhelming social and 
financial costs. Finally, effective corporate governance 
ensures better relationship with all stakeholders of the 
corporation. And thus improves the relationship with society, 
labor and others also (Enobakhane, 2010).  The board of 
directors holds the key role of effecting corporate governance 
mechanism (Blair, 1995). By creating a literature board 
structure considering board size, board committees, and 
board diversity it could be used as a alternative for measuring 
corporate governance practices in firms (Enobakhane, 2010). 
Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2009) argued that a board 
structure is an essential part of the firm as it helps to increase 
the value of organization. To align management and 
shareholders’ interests, reducing agency costs and forming a 
link between management actions and performance 
nomination and remuneration committee acts as an effective 
tool (Romano et al, 2012).  Adams and Ferreira (2009) found 
out that there is no relationship of financial performance with 
having an independent director; but, Kaplan and Minton 
(1995) reported that when director is appointed from outside 
than performance of corporation become poor. In past 
empirical researched in the last decades it is shown that there 
is no significant relationship between board structure and 
banks performance (Adams & Mehran, 2008; Romano et al., 
2012). In a similar empirical research performed in the 
Middle East and North Africa shows that there is a positive 
relationship between bank performances with corporate 
governance (Enobakhare, 2010). 
 
IV.  HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY  
 
       For examining the impact of different concepts, 
principles, obstacles and enablers of corporate governance on 
financial performance of private commercial banks in 
Bangladesh, the following hypotheses have been framed.  
                                                                              
International Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences (IJEAS) 
 ISSN: 2394-3661, Volume-5, Issue-4, April 2018 
                                                                                           91                                                                          www.ijeas.org 
 
 
  
OC=Corporate Governance, DT=Discloser & Transparency, 
ECG=Enablers that improve corporate governance,  
 
FP=Financial Performance, OACG=Obstacles that affect 
corporate governance, OPG=Overall Concept, RoS=Role of 
Stakeholders’, RB=Responsibility of Board Directors, and 
ROS=Shareholders' Right 
 
H1: There is significant and positive relationship between the 
concept of corporate governance and financial performance. 
H2: There is significant positive relationship between the 
disclosure & transparency and overall principles of corporate 
governance. 
H3: There is significant positive relationship between the 
enablers that improve corporate governance and financial 
performance. 
H4: There is significant positive relationship between the 
obstacles that affect corporate governance and financial 
performance. 
H5: There is significant positive relationship between the 
Overall Principles of Corporate Governance and financial 
performance. 
H6: There is significant positive relationship between the 
responsibilities of board director’s and Overall Principles of 
Corporate Governance. 
H7There is significant positive relationship between the 
rights of shareholders and Overall Principles of Corporate 
Governance. 
H8: There is significant positive relationship between the role 
of stakeholders in corporate governance and Overall 
Principles of Corporate Governance. 
V. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In the literature, the related studies suggest that the types of 
factors in path model applications in different commercial 
banks concept of corporate governance, disclosure & 
transparency, enablers that improve corporate governance, 
obstacles that affect corporate governance, responsibility of 
board directors, rights of shareholders, role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance. The theoretical model is presented in 
figure 1. We will look at the theoretical model for each of the 
hypotheses in the following bellow. 
 
VI. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY  
     This study is to explore the linkage between corporate 
governance and financial performance in an emerging 
economy concerned with the use of different factors like 
concept of corporate governance, disclosure & transparency, 
enablers that improve corporate governance, obstacles that 
affect corporate governance, responsibility of board directors, 
rights of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance in private commercial banks in Bangladesh. To 
conduct the study, the data have been collected from primary 
sources like different private commercial banks in 
Bangladesh.  
Determination of Sample Size: 
The employee’s selected for this study heterogeneous in terms 
of their subjects. The statistics show that there was more than 
50 thousand employees are in different private commercial 
banks in Bangladesh. Remember that prior research suggested 
that a sample size of 100-200 is usually a good starting point 
in carrying out path modeling (Hoyle, 1995). The sampled 
customers can be determined by using the following formula 
suggested by Yamane (1967). The formula used in this study 
is shown below: 
n=  
Where, 
n=Sample Size 
N= Population 
e=Level of Precision 
In calculating sample size the following assumptions were 
made to determine, n=204 
Population size is > 50000 employees 
Level of precision is 7% 
Questionnaire Design, Data collection and Test of Reliability 
A structured questionnaire with the 5-points scale was 
developed for the items related to the impact of different 
functions of corporate governance principles & procedures on 
financial performance of private commercial banks in 
Bangladesh. A 5-point scale ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 
indicating strongly disagrees and 5 indicating strongly agree 
was used in the questionnaire. A survey has been conducted 
different private commercial banks in Bangladesh with the 
assistance of many students about CA background who are 
now in different private commercial banks as an external 
auditor. The interviewers were properly trained on the items 
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representing the questionnaire for data collection before 
resuming the interview. Table-2 shows that the reliability 
coefficient of the questionnaire. It shows that the cronbach’s 
alpha, composite reliability, the average variance extracted of 
the questionnaire are shown table-2 which is at the acceptable 
limit as per Nunnally and Berstein (1994), Hair et al. 1998, 
Fornell & Larcker, (1981); Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 
(2009) respectively).  
Along with descriptive statistics, inferential statistical 
techniques such as Factor analysis, and structural equation 
modeling were used to analysis the data by using SPSS 
(Statistical Package for Social Science) and SmartPLS 
(statistical software). Structural equation modeling was 
conducted to identify the influential factors; those factors 
have been affected on financial performance of those banks in 
this study.  
Table 01: Demographic Information of the respondents who 
have continued their job in different management level of 
commercial banks in Bangladesh 
Description Frequency Percent 
Age   
 30 years or less 50 24 
31-40 years 45 21 
41-50 years 25 12 
51-60 years 18 9 
More than 60 years 72 34 
Position   
Senior manager or CEO 56 27 
Board member 55 26 
Audit committee member 47 22 
Accountant 20 10 
Internal auditor 32 15 
Level of Education   
PhD. 35 17 
Masters 60 29 
Bachelor 45 21 
Others ( like BIBM) 20 10 
Professional (CA, CMA etc) 50 24 
Major Educational Qualification   
Accounting 54 26 
Finance 47 22 
Management 40 19 
Economics 10 5 
Other 59 28 
Experience   
 Less than 5 years 55 26 
5-10 years 45 21 
11-15 years 50 24 
16-20 years 20 10 
More than 20 years 40 19 
Table-1 provides the frequency distribution of the 
management people of commercial banks. A total of 210 
employees of private commercial bank were included in this 
study, majority per cent of the respondents in private 
commercial bank whose age were 50 years and above.  More 
than 26% of the employees, there positions were in senior 
manager or CEO and board member in this sector. More than 
29% of the employees, their level of education were in 
Masters in this sector.  
Above 28% of the employees, their major educational 
qualification was in other that means not in accounting, 
finance, management or economics in this sector. Exactly 
26% of the employees, their experience were less than 5 years 
in this sector. 
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Measurement model evaluation 
We tested a measurement model at the item level to check 
whether scale items were adequate indicators of their 
underlying constructs. The measurement model revealed 
seven latent constructs (i.e. Corporate Governance, Discloser 
& Transparency, Enablers that improve corporate 
governance, Obstacles that affect corporate governance, Role 
of Stakeholders’, Responsibility of Board Directors, and 
Shareholders' Right). 
The internal consistency statistics were assessed by 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (CR) (Hair et al. 
1998), which were represented in Table III. Both the 
Cronbach’s alpha and CR of all constructs were above the 
threshold of 0.7. Therefore, all the items used in this study 
were found reliable. We proceeded to test the construct 
validity by measuring average variance extracted (AVE), 
which measures the percentage of the variance captured by a 
construct by showing the ratio of the sum of the variance 
captured by the construct and measurement variance. Table 
III shows that the AVE of each construct was greater than a 
threshold of 0.5 (Yoo and Alavi, 2001). 
Further, we tested the discriminant validity examining 
whether a construct better explains the variance of its own 
indicators than the variance of other constructs. The 
correlations estimated between every two constructs were 
from 0.03 to 0.82. Table IV illustrates that the square root of 
the AVE of each construct, representing in the diagonal 
positions, was higher than the entries in the corresponding 
rows and columns. Hence, the results support the discriminant 
validity of all constructs in the hypothesized model. 
 
Table 02: The measurement model 
  Alpha CR AVE 
Corporate Governance 0.61 0.77 0.64 
Discloser & Transparency 0.71 0.83 0.63 
Enablers that improve corporate 
governance 
0.73 0.83 0.55 
Financial Performance 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Obstacles that affect corporate 
governance 
0.60 0.80 0.67 
Overall Concept 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Role of Stakeholders’ 0.75 0.84 0.56 
Responsibility of Board 
Directors 
0.54 0.76 0.51 
Shareholders' Right 0.81 0.88 0.64 
 
Note: AVE>0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981); Henseler, 
Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009), Composite Reliability>0.70 
(Hair et al. 1998), Cronbach’s alpha>= 0.60, (Nunnally and 
Berstein (1994)) Indicator Reliability>=0.4 (Hulland, 1999) 
 
Table 03: Discriminent Validity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CG .80         
DT .13 .79        
ECG .07 .17 .74       
FP .12 .14 .31 1.0      
OAC .06 .16 .12 .34 .82     
OPG .03 .28 .44 0.37 .52 .81    
RB .05 .19 .54 .36 .56 .57 .76   
RSG .04 .07 0.39 .34 .33 .57 .52 .72  
RoS .04 .08 .21 0.20 .29 .41 .57 .34 .8 
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Exploratory Factor Analysis 
EFA is a widely utilized and broadly applied statistical 
technique in social science. A total 210 usable survey 
responses were analyzed in this section. The factor analysis 
technique has been applied to determine the relationship 
between different factors in corporate governance. The seven 
factors that have found from the rotated factor matrix, have 
been discussed in the following paragraph. 
Factor-1 (Concept of Corporate Governance): This factor 
includes two variables like relationship with all stakeholders, 
relationship with all members of society which are the 
principal factors. So, it provides a basis for conceptualization 
of a dimension which may be identified as concept of 
corporate governance factor. 
 
Factor-2 (Disclosure & Transparency): This includes three 
variables like financial and operating results, objectives of the 
company, and ownership, which are the principal factors. So, 
it provides a basis for conceptualization of a dimension which 
may be identified as disclosure & transparency factor.  
 
Factor-3 (Enablers that Improve Corporate Governance): 
This includes four variables like training support, compliance 
with principles, establishing an institute of directors for 
training, raising awareness and education, establishing 
corporate governance education programs at universities 
which are the principal factors. So, it provides a basis for 
conceptualization of a dimension which may be identified as 
enablers that improve corporate governance factor. 
 
Factor-4 (Obstacles that affect Corporate Governance): This 
includes two variables like law enforcement, quality 
accounting and finance education which are the principal 
factors. So, it provides a basis for conceptualization of a 
dimension which may be identified as obstacles that affect 
corporate governance factor. 
 
Factor-5 (Responsibility of Board Directors): This includes 
five variables like Board members act accordingly, 
stakeholders’ interests, and effectiveness of governance 
practices which is the principal factors. So, it provides a basis 
for conceptualization of a dimension which may be identified 
as responsibility of board director’s factor. 
Factor-6 (Rights of Shareholders): This includes four 
variables like ownership transfer facility, profit sharing, right 
of obtaining company informed, right of vote, which are the 
principal factors. So, it provides a basis for conceptualization 
of a dimension which may be identified as rights of 
shareholders factor. 
Factor-7 (Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance): 
This includes two variables like rights by law are respected, 
developed Performance-enhancing mechanisms, effective 
redress for violation of their rights, timely information, which 
are the principal factors. So, it provides a basis for 
conceptualization of a dimension which may be identified as 
role of stakeholders in corporate governance factor. 
Table 02: Factor Analysis of Corporate Governance on 
Financial performance in Commercial Banks of Bangladesh 
Factors Variables 
Origina
l 
Sample 
Samp
le 
Mean  
SD 
T 
Statist
ics  
IR 
Corporate 
Governance 
CG2 <- 
CG 
0.96 0.74 0.38 2.50 0.9 
CG3 <- 
CG 
0.70 0.59 0.33 2.10 0.5 
Discloser & 
Transparency 
DT1 <- 
DT 
0.72 0.70 0.09 7.65 0.5 
DT2 <- 
DT 
0.86 0.85 0.06 13.98 0.7 
DT3 <- 
DT 
0.79 0.79 0.10 8.34 0.6 
Enablers that 
improve 
corporate 
governance 
ECG2 
<-ECG 
0.75 0.72 0.14 5.34 0.6 
ECG3 
<-ECG 
0.74 0.71 0.13 5.75 0.5 
ECG4 
<-ECG 
0.76 0.75 0.08 9.12 0.6 
ECG5 
-ECG 
0.74 0.73 0.09 8.58 0.5 
Bank 
Performance 
FP 
-------
-FP 
1.00 1.00 0.00     
Obstacles that 
affect 
corporate 
governance 
OAC1 
<-OAC 
0.77 0.72 0.17 4.45 0.6 
OAC4 
<-OAC 
0.86 0.86 0.09 9.68 0.7 
Overall 
Concept 
OPG <- 
OPG 
1.00 1.00 0.00     
Role of 
Stakeholders’ 
RB1 <- 
RB 
0.67 0.67 0.07 10.15 0.5 
RB2 <- 
RB 
0.68 0.67 0.07 9.26 0.5 
RB3 <- 
RB 
0.86 0.85 0.03 25.49 0.7 
RB4 <- 
RB 
0.78 0.77 0.09 8.96 0.6 
Responsibility 
of Board 
Directors 
RSG1 
<- RSG 
0.67 0.64 0.13 5.13 0.5 
RSG2 
<- RSG 
0.83 0.83 0.09 8.87 0.7 
RSG3 
<- RSG 
0.63 0.57 0.23 2.69 0.4 
Shareholders' 
Right 
RoS1 <- 
RoS 
0.83 0.80 0.12 6.71 0.7 
RoS2 <- 
RoS 
0.76 0.77 0.05 14.70 0.6 
RoS3 <- 
RoS 
0.89 0.88 0.05 17.14 0.8 
RoS4 <- 
RoS 
0.71 0.70 0.07 10.11 0.5 
OC=Corporate Governance, DT=Discloser & Transparency, 
ECG=Enablers that improve corporate governance, 
FP=Financial performance, OACG=Obstacles that affect 
corporate governance, OPG=Overall Concept of Corporate 
Governance, RoS=Role of Stakeholders’, RB=Responsibility 
of Board Directors, and ROS=Shareholders' Right, IR>0.40 
(Hulland, 1999) 
From table-2 shows that all of the T-Statistic is larger than 
1.96 at the 5% level of significance, we can say that the outer 
model loadings are statistically significant. So, our SEM 
model is accepted for above evidence in this study. Generally, 
A global fit measure (GOF) was conducted for path modeling; 
it is defined as the geometric mean of average of AVE and 
average   (especially endogenous variables) (Chin, 2010) (see 
the formula). In this study, GOF value was 0.83 ( = 0.195, 
average AVE = 0.64 for overall financial performance). So, 
the value of GOF exceeded the largest cutoff value (0.36), and 
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it was indicated that the proposed model of this study had 
better explaining power than that based on the recommended 
value of GOF small = 0.1, GOF medium = 0.25, and GOF 
large = 0.36 (Akter et al., 2011). 
 
GOF=  
Results of Multivariate Analysis - Partial Least Square (PLS) 
A multivariate analysis technique like ‘Partial Least Square’ 
was used to identify the significant job satisfaction factors 
from the factors identified through factor analysis. Table 05 
describes the structural model with the variance explained 
(R2) and the path coefficients of all the constructs. We found 
that enablers that improve corporate governance ( 0.262; 
t-statistic=3.366; p<0.001), Obstacles that affect corporate 
governance ( 0.270; t-statistic=2.849; p<0.05), had a positive 
and significantly impact on bank financial performance. Thus, 
the results support the H6, and H7. The R2 for retention was 
0.195, indicating that the variation in the all corporate 
governance factors can be explained 19.5 per cent of the total 
variance the results support only two hypothses H6, and H7 
but not others. (Figure 3). In table 03 also shows every values 
of VIF (variance inflation factor) have been represent that 
there is no multicollinearity effect among those factors 
because the value of VIF is not higher than 3. 
 
Table 03: Summary Results of the Model Constructs 
 
Original 
Sample 
SD 
T 
Statistics 
Conclusion  VIF 
CG -> 
FP 
0.094 0.099 0.944 
Not 
Supported 
1.054 
DT -> 
OPG 
0.341 0.039 8.766 
Supported 1.033 
ECG -> 
FP 
0.262 0.078 3.366 
Supported 1.026 
OAC 
-> FP 
0.270 0.095 2.849 
Supported 1.559 
OPG -> 
FP 
0.051 0.131 0.391 
Not 
Supported 
1.587 
RB -> 
OPG 
0.231 0.070 3.282 
Supported 1.854 
RSG -> 
OPG 
0.134 0.084 1.592 
Not 
Supported 
1.363 
RoS -> 
OPG 
0.375 0.062 6.021 
Supported 1.497 
Multicollinearity Statistic (VIF) the rules of thumb for the 
VIF are as follows: VIF < 3; no problem, VIF > 3; potential 
problem, VIF > 5; very likely problem, VIF > 10; definitely 
problem. 
VIII. CONCLUSION & MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION  
This study has been able to achieve its main objective. It has 
also been able to answer all of the research questions. More 
specifically, the study has comprehensively investigated 
corporate governance practices in private commercial banks 
of Bangladesh. It has also identified the possible barriers to, 
enablers of, the implementation of good corporate 
governance. Essentially, this study has used path diagram 
models to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance principles financial performance in private 
commercial banks of Bangladesh. The path coefficients of the 
factors concerned with CG principle & procedure show that 
the concept of corporate governance, disclosure & 
transparency, enablers that improve corporate governance, 
obstacles that affect corporate governance, responsibility of 
board directors, rights of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance of private commercial 
banks in Bangladesh. (Table 3) By using SEM analysis firstly 
it is found that, only four factors such disclosure & 
transparency, responsibility of board directors, rights of 
shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
those are significantly affected on overall principles of 
corporate governance at 5% level of significance. But finally 
two factors enablers that improve corporate governance, 
obstacles that affect corporate governance those are 
statistically significant impact on financial performance but 
not overall principles of corporate governance. This study 
suggests that in representative banks of Bangladesh, the 
policy makers and concerned authorities should focus more 
on the factors like enablers that improve corporate 
governance, obstacles that affect corporate governance. The 
results of the analysis also indicate the impact of corporate 
governance on bank financial performance. This study 
supports the argument that there is a positive relationship 
between corporate governance factors and bank financial 
performance in private commercial banks of Bangladesh. 
Overall, the model has been very useful in achieving the 
objectives of this study. 
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